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In spring 2003 I moved from Vir-ginia to Texas to begin work as atenure-track faculty member at
Texas Tech University School of Law.
I brought my two dogs with me: Saffy
(a four-year-old mixed breed whose
parents were a fluffy red Chow Chow
and a big black Labrador retriever)
and Semona (a two-year-old rot-
tweiler). Neither Semona nor Saffy
has ever bitten anyone. Neither has
shown any aggressive tendencies.
Both are extremely playful and
friendly animals.
After I placed a bid on a house in
Lubbock, Texas, I began the search
for homeowners’ insurance—a
process that I thought would be
straightforward and easy. Much to
my surprise, dozens of insurance
companies denied my application
outright. The reason?  Semona is a
rottweiler and Saffy is half-Chow.
Rottweilers and Chow Chows are on
the “blacklist” of dog breeds. Some
insurance companies believe they,
along with pit bulls, huskies, Dober-
man pinschers, and other specified
breeds, are more likely to bite
humans and, in turn, cause liability
claims to be brought against their
owners. Even mixed breeds, like my
half-Chow, Saffy, are blacklisted.
This practice is known by many dog
owners as “breed discrimination.”
Thankfully, the story ended hap-
pily for my dogs and me. After weeks
of calling nearly every insurance
agent in Lubbock, I was able to
obtain insurance through the Texas
Farm Bureau, an organization that
advocates for farmers and farming
issues.1 Had it not been for the Farm
Bureau, I would have found myself
on the horns of a horrible dilemma:
whether to buy a home or give up
my dogs. Anyone who knows me can
confirm that this dilemma would
have been easy to resolve; I would
have chosen my furry family mem-
bers over home ownership.2 Sadly,
however, many Americans are find-
ing themselves in similar positions
and are opting to give up their dogs
to animal shelters.3
Breed discrimination by insur-
ance companies is on the rise in the
United States. Insurers are refusing
to write homeowners’ policies for
people who own breeds that the
insurance industry considers to be
dangerous. Their decisions are
based solely on the breed of the ani-
mal, not the individual characteris-
tics of the particular dog. Dog bites
are certainly a public health con-
cern. However, the insurance indus-
try’s approach to the problem is
based on faulty assumptions and
improper use of dog-bite statistics.
The insurance industry has pre-
judged entire breeds of dogs as
being “too risky,” instead of taking
a more reasonable dog-by-dog
approach to risk assessment.
Major veterinary and breed reg-
istry organizations have strongly
opposed breed discrimination in
insurance. Authors of scientific
studies on dog bites have even
argued against the use of their
data to support breed-based deci-
sion-making by insurers and legis-
latures. Dog owners across the
country have spoken out about the
horrible choice they have been
forced to make between obtaining
insurance and keeping their dogs. 
There has existed a historic ten-
sion between risk classification and
social policy. Classification and
insurability decisions are usually
“actuarially justified”—that is, the
insurance company has identified a
statistical correlation between a
characteristic and increased risk.
Actuarial justification is frequently
cited by insurers as a reason to
avoid social regulation. Insurers
exist to make a profit for their
shareholders. They do so by mini-
mizing risk, which, in turn, mini-
mizes claims paid out.
Actuarial justification is only the
first step in determining the social
This essay was originally published in the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal (Vol. ll, No. l, 2004–2005). The
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propriety of a proposed underwrit-
ing mechanism. Social utility of the
risky conduct must also be consid-
ered. Statutes across the United
States are replete with examples of
legislatures overruling actuarially
justified practices in favor of com-
peting social policies. “Red-lining”
is a classic example. Actuaries iden-
tified statistical correlations be-
tween living in certain neighbor-
hoods and increased risk for claims
against homeowners’ policies. As a
result, insurance companies began
to refuse to write policies in these
high-risk neighborhoods. The
neighborhoods in question were
often economically depressed and
occupied by members of racial or
ethnic minorities. Legislatures and
courts stepped in to prohibit red-
lining, despite the actuarial justifi-
cation for the practice.4
Breed discrimination is a differ-
ent animal altogether. Even with-
out considering the high social
utility of pet ownership, insurers
have been unable to demonstrate
an actuarial justification for dis-
criminating based on breed. As
the multidisciplinary Task Force
on Canine Aggression and Human-
Canine Interactions concluded,
“[D]og bite statistics are not
really statistics, and they do not
give an accurate picture of dogs
that bite.”5 The popular notion
that pit bulls and rottweilers are
inherently more likely to bite is
simply not supported by the avail-
able statistics. 
When the social utility of pets is
added to the equation, breed dis-
crimination becomes even more
unreasonable. Dogs and other do-
mesticated animals provide im-
measurable joy and happiness to
the families that own them. Even
some components of the legal sys-
tem itself have evolved to recog-
nize pets as being more than mere
chattel.6 In addition, the failure to
obtain homeowners’ insurance is a
death knell for homeownership—
no insurance, no mortgage; no
mortgage, no house.
My argument is quite simple:
decisions regarding the provision,
rating, termination, or renewal of a
homeowners’ insurance policy
should not be based on ownership
or possession of a particular breed
of dog unless there is evidence of
dog-specific risk. Insurers would
concededly be actuarially justified
in charging higher premiums or
declining coverage for people who
own dogs that have unjustly bitten
in the past. After all, the best pre-
dictor of future behavior is past be-
havior. Breed discrimination, as it
currently stands, is not actuarially
justified because scientists have
not been able to accurately deter-
mine whether certain breeds are
inherently more dangerous, or,
instead, whether a breed’s high
population is making it appear
that the breed is more dangerous. 
The consequences of breed dis-
crimination could not be greater.
Homeowners’ insurance is the
gatekeeper to homeownership.
Without homeowners’ insurance, a
buyer cannot get a mortgage. For
most Americans, if a person can-
not obtain a mortgage, he cannot
buy a home. 
In Part I of this article, I give an
overview of the problem: dog breed
discrimination by insurers, as well
as a related problem of breed-spe-
cific legislation by some states. In
Part II, I analyze the major scien-
tific studies on dog bites, showing
that no one has adequately proven
that some breeds are more inher-
ently dangerous than others. In
Part III, I show that breed discrim-
ination and breed-specific legisla-
tion are opposed by most veteri-
nar y and animal protection
groups. Part IV demonstrates that
insurers have been ignoring the
unique and special role that pets
play in millions of American
homes. I draw upon not only the
profoundly personal arguments
advanced by myself and others, but
also the way in which the law itself
is evolving by recognizing pets as
more than mere property. Part V
shows how the insurance industry
is a highly regulated industry that
subjects itself to legislative control
where, as here, the public is being
harmed by underwriting decisions
not driven by actuarial justifica-
tion. I also offer a number of alter-
natives to breed discrimination.
I. Dog Breed
Discrimination
Breed discrimination in insurance
is a recent phenomenon that was
preceded by the enactment of
“breed-specific legislation” (BSL)
by some state legislatures and
municipalities. Both breed dis-
crimination and BSL are a per-
ceived response to highly publi-





In the 1980s there were a number
of high-profile attacks on humans
by pit bulls. These attacks led to a
near-hysterical reaction by mem-
bers of the communities that
were affected by the attacks and
by the legislators who repre-
sented them.
I n  M a rc h  1 9 8 4 ,  p i t  b u l l s
attacked Angie Hands, a nine-year-
old girl in Tijeras, New Mexico.7
The dogs bit her right leg to the
bone, ripped flesh from her arms,
and tore her ear in half.8 The child
survived but had to undergo years
of reconstructive surgery.9 She had
been attacked by her uncle’s four
pit bulls in between her bus stop
and her home.10 The small commu-
nity of Tijeras, located outside of
Albuquerque, responded with an
outright ban on pit bull owner-
ship.11 Dog owners challenged the
law in court, but the law was
upheld as a constitutional exercise
of the town’s police power.12
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The attack on Angie Hands fol-
lowed a number of other pit bull
attacks around the country. A four-
year-old girl was killed in Oregon
City, Oregon, when she fell into a
yard where a pit bull was chained.13
Two pit bulls mutilated their owner
in Edgemere, Maryland.14 A re-
cent, widely publicized attack in
San Francisco has also brought the
issue of aggressive dogs to the fore-
front of public attention. In Janu-
ar y 2001, Diana Whipple was
mauled to death by two Presa
Canario dogs. The dogs were
owned by a pair of lawyers. Evi-
dence at the owners’ murder trials
showed that the dogs had tried to
attack other people and animals
in the past. Both defendants were
convicted and served prison
time.15 A subsequent civil lawsuit




Highly publicized pit bull attacks
in the 1980s led to knee-jerk reac-
tions by many communities.17
Attacks led to editorials, which led
to public outrage, which led to
swift and spontaneous legislative
action that was based on neither
good science nor good law. BSL
began to emerge in the 1980s and
early 1990s. These laws targeted
specific breeds for regulation or, in
some cases, outright bans. BSL is
on the rise in the United States.
States and municipalities across
the country have considered—and,
in some cases, enacted—breed-
specific legislation designed to
protect the public against dog
bites.18 Commonly, these statutes
and ordinances have banned, or
placed restrictions on, pit bulls,
rottweilers, Doberman pinschers,
Chow Chows, German shepherds,
and shar-peis.19
Ohio has aggressively targeted
pit bulls for regulation. Ohio law
declares any dog that “[b]elongs to
a breed that is commonly known as
a pit bull dog”20 is automatically a
“vicious dog.”21 “Vicious dogs”
must be penned or tied up when on
their owners’ premises.22 If off-
premises, they must be tethered,
caged, or muzzled.23 Owners must
obtain liability insurance to provide
coverage in the event of a bite.24
BSL has also occurred at the local
municipal level. Denver passed an
outright ban on the ownership, pos-
session, keeping, control, mainte-
nance, harboring, transportation, or
sale of pit bulls.25 A “pit bull” is
defined as an American pit bull ter-
rier, American Staffordshire terrier,
Staffordshire bull terrier, or any dog
displaying the majority of physical
traits of one of those breeds.26 This
ordinance is in addition to Denver’s
“dangerous dog” ordinance that reg-
ulates “[a]ny dog with a known
propensity or disposition to attack un-
provoked, to cause injury or to other-
wise endanger the safety of humans
or other domestic animals.”27 “Dan-
gerous dogs” must be confined while
at home and must be leashed and
muzzled while traveling.28
Not all states have followed the
BSL trend. Some legislatures have
prohibited BSL enacted by munici-
palities. Florida enacted a statute
that permits localities to regulate
dogs “provided that no such regu-
lation is specific to breed.”29 Some
legislators have attempted, with-
out success, to repeal this anti-BSL
statute in response to several
highly publicized attacks.30 Min-
nesota also has the following pro-
hibition against BSL:
A statutory or home rule char-
ter city, or a county, may not
adopt an ordinance regulating
dangerous or potentially dan-
gerous dogs based solely on
the specific breed of the dog.31
Court challenges to BSL have
been largely unsuccessful.32 Oppo-
nents of BSL have brought lawsuits
claiming the legislation is unconsti-
tutional because it violates due pro-
cess (substantive and procedural),
the Takings Clause,33 equal protec-
tion, and the vagueness doctrine.34
Plaintiffs have challenged BSL on
due process grounds by arguing
that there was no “rational relation-
ship” to a legitimate legislative goal
or purpose.35 Courts have ruled that
BSL is a rational response to a per-
ceived problem of dog bites by cer-
tain breeds.36 They have also
rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that
the statutes and ordinances do not
provide dog owners with sufficient
notice and an opportunity to be
heard, which are the requirements
for procedural due process.37 The
Tijeras ordinance, for example, pro-
vides that a pit bull may be de-
stroyed by the village only after a
hearing to determine whether the
dog is, in fact, a pit bull.38 Plaintiffs
have also contended that BSL
amounts to a taking without just
compensation. Courts have rejected
this argument, noting that personal
property is subject to regulation
under the police power of a state.39
Challenges based on vagueness have
argued that identifying a dog’s breed
is difficult.40 Most courts have found
BSL to be sufficiently specific to
enable a reasonable dog owner to
determine if his or her dog is covered
by the particular statute.41 Plaintiffs
have also alleged that BSL violates
equal protection by singling out pit
bulls but not other breeds.42 Courts
have noted that pit bull ownership is
not a “suspect classification,” and,
therefore, BSL need only have some
reasonable basis to be constitutional.
Courts have concluded that sufficient
evidence exists to support a finding
that pit bulls can be regulated by leg-
islatures and municipalities.43
One significant decision found
BSL to be unconstitutional. In
American Dog Owners Association,
Inc. v. City of Lynn,44 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court up-
held a trial court’s finding that the
City of Lynn’s attempt to regulate
pit bulls was unconstitutional.45
The Court noted that it is particu-
larly problematic to determine a
dog’s breed. The Court held,
[T]here is no scientific means,
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by blood, enzyme, or other-
wise, to determine whether a
dog belongs to a particular
breed, regardless of whether
“breed” is used in a formal
sense or not.46
The Court upheld the trial court’s
finding that animal-control officers
had no real standards to identify pit
bulls, in part because they had no
training in breed identification.47
The ordinance included a ban on
mixed-breed dogs that contained
“any mixture” of pit bull.48 This pro-
vision was likewise found to be un-
constitutional since it is scientifi-
cally “impossible to ascertain”
whether a dog is part pit bull.49 The
ordinance was also unconstitutional
because it tried to define “pit bull”
as including any breed where “com-
mon understanding and usage” dic-
tated that the dog was, in fact, a pit
bull.50 The combination of these
facts led the court to conclude that




While some communities and
states have responded to dog bites
with breed-specific legislation de-
signed to regulate or outlaw cer-
tain breeds, insurance companies
have also reacted to the problem of
dog bites in a breed-specific man-
ner. Dubbed “breed discrimina-
tion” by dog owners, insurance
companies have started making
coverage and renewal decisions
based on one’s ownership of cer-
tain breeds of dog.
A Rise in Breed
Discrimination
During 2003 and 2004, the media
brought breed discrimination to
light. The CBS Evening News with
Dan Rather aired a story in June
2003 that featured a family that
had difficulty obtaining insurance
because they owned a dalmatian.52
The report stated, “[A]nimal
lovers have a term for what the in-
surance company did. They call it
‘breed discrimination’—arbitrarily
punishing all dogs of certain
breeds because some are vicious.”53
In the months that followed, sev-
eral newspaper stories discussed
the prevalence of breed discrimina-
tion and documented the effects
this practice has had on families.54
These news reports replicate the
experience I had in trying to get
homeowners’ insurance. Multiple
insurers denied coverage because
of the dogs I owned. I literally
could not find a carrier in the Lub-
bock market willing to write a pol-
icy for me until I stumbled upon
the Farm Bureau on the advice of
one insurance broker who sympa-
thized with my plight.
The practice of breed discrimina-
tion produces absurd results. Con-
sider the case of Chris and Norm
Craanen of San Antonio, Texas.55
They own a twelve-year-old dog
named Bukarus. He is a rottweiler,
a breed often targeted for discrim-
ination by insurance companies.
Yet, Bukarus does not pose much of
a threat: he is deaf, partially blind,
and has arthritis.56 Despite his bite-
free history, his owners lost their
homeowners’ insurance.57
Some of the most well-known in-
surers are engaging in breed dis-
crimination.58 Some insurers have
outright bans on specific breeds,59
while others take a more realistic
and logical dog-by-dog approach.
These decisions are predicated on
insurers’ assessment of relative
risk.60 The “usual suspects” for
breed discrimination are pit bulls,
rottweilers, German shepherds,
Doberman pinschers, Chow Chows,
wolf hybrids, and Presa Canarios.61
The Humane Society of the
United States (HSUS) has docu-
mented an increase in the number
of people being denied insurance
because they own certain breeds of
dog.62 As a result, The HSUS has
started collecting data through the
Internet, in the hopes of eventually
convincing the insurance industry
that there are alternatives to the
current practice and that it must
stop.63 To achieve their goal, The
HSUS and the American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to An-
imals (ASPCA) have created a joint
grass-roots campaign designed to




Homeowners’ insurance protects a
policyholder in the event of finan-
cial loss. Most policies include two
provisions, property damage and
liability. Property damage provi-
sions protect the policyholder in
the event of fire, lightning, wind,
water, or hail damage, theft, and
vandalism. Liability provisions pro-
tect the policyholder in the event
that a claim is made against a
homeowner for negligence. Liabil-
ity coverage typically pays for bod-
ily injury, medical payments, and
property damage that are sus-
tained because of the negligence of
the property owner.65 Absent breed
discrimination, most homeowners’
insurance policies would cover in-
juries due to dog bites on the pre-
mises between the amounts of
$100,000 and $300,000.66 In 1995
the average policyholder paid $418
in homeowners’ insurance premi-
ums.67 By 2004 the average pre-
mium climbed to $608.68
“Insurance is a business.”69 Insur-
ers must make profits in order to
continue in existence.70 Companies
survive by minimizing risk, which
reduces the likelihood of claims.
Some companies have decided that
certain breeds of dog are simply
“too much of a risk” to insure.71 An
industry representative claims that
the issue of dog bites “is a major
concern for insurers.”72
The industry defends its posi-
tion, in part, on a series of studies
from the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC), which
the industry claims as support for
the proposition that certain breeds
have a propensity to bite.73 As I
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demonstrate in Part II, however,
the industry’s reliance on the CDC
studies is misplaced. Even the
authors of the CDC studies have
stated that breed discrimination
is wrong and is not supported by
scientific evidence.74
The industry has also pointed to
the large amount of money that
has been paid out in recent years
for dog-bite claims.75 The Insur-
ance Information Institute (III), a
trade group of the insurance indus-
try, stated that in 2002 $345.5 mil-
lion was paid out in dog-bite liabil-
ity claims, up from $250 million in
1995.76 The group argues that dog-
bite lawsuits are on the rise and
juries are awarding larger claims.77
It claims, therefore, the need to
curtail its risk.
The industry’s cost statistics are
misleading, however. The III states,
“[D]og bites now account for
almost one quarter of all home-
owner’s insurance liability claims
costing $345.5 million.”78 Some
perspective is in order. For
every $100 in premiums, insurers
spend $77 paying claims. Of that
$77, the overwhelming majority
($72, or 93.5 percent) is spent
on paying property damage
claims. Liability claims only
amount to $5, or 6.5 percent, of
total claims.79 Even then, dog
bites only constitute a percentage
of that figure. Put into perspec-
tive, the money paid out in dog-
bite claims is negligible when
compared to the overall amount of
money paid out for other types of
claims. Damage due to lightning,
fire, and mold all individually
account for more claims payouts
than all liability claims combined.80
The insurance industry has not
been consistent in the reasons for
its defense of breed discrimination.
One report from the III’s website
seems to defend breed-specific
responses based on the aggregate
claims paid81 and stories of several
high-profile and tragic bites.82
However, in a statement to a
newsletter of veterinary medicine,
the III defended breed discrimina-
tion on the basis that certain
breeds cause more damage when
and if they do bite.83 Ultimately, a
spokesperson for the III conceded,
“[t]he industry isn’t positioned to
determine which dogs should be
deemed vicious....[W]e’re certainly
not dog experts or veterinari-
ans.”84 This, however, has not
stopped many insurers from engag-
ing in breed discrimination.
Some Exceptions 
to the Rule?
It appears that not all insurers
have followed the breed discrimi-
nation trend. DVM reported that
Nationwide Insurance changed its
breed discrimination policy in
October 2003. While Nationwide
now insures all dog owners, it
specifically excludes dog bites from
its liability coverage.85
State Farm’s national represen-
tatives have repeatedly stated that
the company does not practice
breed discrimination.86 However,
when I searched for homeowners’
insurance in 2003, a State Farm
agent in Lubbock refused to even




There are other examples where a
person’s ownership of a particular
breed of dog can have negative
consequences. Families seeking to
adopt children can face roadblocks
if they own dogs that belong to cer-
tain breeds. In Massachusetts the
Adoption and Foster Care Unit of
the Department of Social Services
will not place children in homes
with certain breeds of dog.87 The
state relied upon data provided by
the insurance industry when it
made its decision to discriminate
based on breed.88 Some airlines
also practice breed discrimination
by prohibiting some dogs from fly-
ing, even though they are stored in
cargo and in a closed carrier.89
II. The Lack of
Scientific Evidence
Numerous scientific studies have
attempted to identify the number
of annual dog bites, the dogs most
likely to bite, the people most
likely to be bitten, and the circum-
stances under which bites are most
likely to occur. Such studies have
not reached a uniform consensus
and have left us with more ques-
tions than answers. Even the stud-
ies that have attempted to report
on breeds’ proclivity to bite have
cautioned that their research is
incomplete and should not be used
to justify breed discrimination by
legislatures or insurers.90
CDC Statistics
The CDC commissioned a number
of studies during the 1980s and
1990s to determine the scope and
nature of the problem of dog bites
in the United States. 
Fatality Studies
Four separate studies attempted to
chronicle the number of fatal dog
bites  dur ing the  per iods  o f
1979–1988,91 1989–1994,92 1995–
1996,93 and 1997–1998.94 The
studies were specifically limited to
fatal dog attacks because fatality
statistics are easier to track.95 Non-
fatal bites were excluded from the
studies, although other scientists
have attempted to use emergency
department reports and other
sources to determine the number
of nonfatal bites per year.96
The authors combed three sets
of sources in an attempt to deter-
mine the number of fatal dog bites
per year. First, they searched
NEXIS for news reports of dog bite-
related fatalities.97 Second, they
used the National Center for
Health Statistics’ (NCHS) single-
cause mortality tapes (SCMTs) to
identify deaths where the underly-
ing cause was listed as a dog bite.98
Finally, the authors supplemented
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these reports with information col-
lected by The HSUS to help iden-
tify the breed of dog involved in
each incident.99 From these three
sources, the authors tried to piece
together the number of people
who died each year in the United
States from dog bites.
The authors concluded that dog
bites caused approximately seven
deaths per year per hundred mil-
lion people.100 They discerned no
identifiable trend that would indi-
cate an increase in the incidence
of fatal bites over the years of the
studies.101 During the first report-
ing period (1979–1988), approxi-
mately 70 percent of victims were
under the age of ten.102 Males,
under the age of twenty-nine, were
more likely than females to be vic-
tims.103 These findings as to age
and gender  were consistent
throughout the study periods.
Many of the fatal bites of children
involved horrific attacks on the very
young. A three-week-old girl was
killed in her crib by the family’s
Chow Chow.104 A two-year-old boy in
South Dakota wandered into a
neighbor’s yard, where he was
attacked and killed by two German
shepherd-wolf hybrids.105 The elderly
were also victims of several fatal
attacks. In March 1996 two rottweil-
ers killed an eighty-six-year-old Ten-
nessee woman. One month before
the assault, the dogs had attacked
and injured the same woman.106
In the twenty-year period of the
CDC studies, the breed responsible
for the most number of bites has
changed.107 From 1979 to 1980,
Great Danes caused the most num-
ber of fatalities, with three deaths
for the period. However, four
breeds were tied with two deaths
each: pit bulls, rottweilers, huskies,
and malamutes.108 In 1981 pit bulls
took over as the breed with the
most number of fatal bites.109 Pit
bulls remained in that position
until 1993, when rottweilers began
causing approximately ten fatal
bites per two-year reporting
period.110 The last available report-
ing period, 1997—1998, shows
that rottweilers caused ten fatal
bites per two-year period, while pit
bulls caused six, and Saint Ber-
nards caused three.111 During the
twenty-year study, ninety deaths
were excluded because the breed
was “unavailable.”112
The authors of the CDC studies
acknowledged that the methods
they used in their studies had a
number of limitations. NEXIS, they
pointed out, was not designed for
scientific research. News reports
would only be flagged if their text
contained certain keywords.113
Further,  rel iance on NEXIS
assumes that newspapers accu-
rately reported the breed of dog
involved in a particular attack.114
SCMTs have a one- to two-year lag
time, which means that some fatal-
ities may have been missed.115 The
authors believed that, on average,
their methods only uncovered
approximately 74 percent of dog-
bite-related fatalities.116
Even if one accepts the CDC sta-
tistics as definitive on the subject,
they have a number of other limita-
tions in answering the question
of whether certain breeds are more
dangerous than others. First, the
studies were limited to fatal dog
attacks.117 Second, the breed of
the dog could not be accurately de-
termined in every case.118 Finally,
the number of fatal attacks per
year is so low that it is problematic
to statistically extrapolate conclu-
sions from the data. For example,
in the first two years of the study
(1979–1980), Great Danes ac-
counted for the most number of
fatal bites (three).119 Four breeds,
however, followed closely behind
with two fatal bites each (pit bull,
German shepherd, husky, and mal-
amute).120 It would be statistically
questionable to conclude that
Great Danes were inherently more
dangerous than the other breeds,




The CDC fatality studies acknowl-
edged that, while death rates for
dog bites do not appear to have
increased over time,121 nonfatal
bites were becoming more of a
public health problem.122 The CDC
conducted a study of nonfatal dog
bites in 2001.123 The study used
data from the National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System-All In-
jury Program (NEISS-AIP) to iden-
tify the number of nonfatal dog
bites during the 2001 calendar
year. NEISS-AIP collects data from
initial visits to emergency depart-
ments (EDs) across the country.124
NEISS-AIP data are drawn from a
nationally representative sample of
NEISS hospitals.125 The CDC ana-
lyzed every case where “dog bite”
was listed as the external cause of
injury.126
In total, NEISS-AIP data revealed
that hospital EDs treated 6,106
patients for dog-bite-related in-
juries during 2001.127 Since the
NEISS-AIP data did not include
every hospital in the nation, the
authors used these data to extrap-
olate to the general population.128
They estimated that 368,245 peo-
ple were treated for dog-bite-
related injuries in 2001.129 The
largest cohort of victims was chil-
dren between the ages of five and
nine.130 Boys, under the age of
fourteen, were more likely than
girls to be seen in EDs for dog-bite-
related injuries.131
The NEISS-AIP data included
narratives for many of the attacks.
One case involved a four-year-old
who was bitten by a dog guarding
her puppies.132 Another involved a
three-year-old girl who was bitten
when she tried to take away a
dog’s food.133 A thirty-four-year-old
man was bitten while trying to
break up a dogfight. Some victims
were bitten by their own dogs. A
twenty-seven-year-old woman was
bitten by her dog after he had
been hit by a car and became dis-
31
oriented.134 A seventy-five-year-old
woman was attacked while trying
to prevent her dog from biting an
emergency medical technician
(EMT) who was attempting to put
the woman in an ambulance.135
The Morbidity and Mortality
report describing the study does
not document the number of
attacks per breed. This is likely due
to the fact that the ED reports did
not specify the breed of dog. An
attempt to determine the number
of bites per breed would depend on
victims accurately self-reporting
the breed of the attacking dog.136 
The study had a number of limi-
tations. First, the authors excluded
fatal dog bites. Second, the study
only examined cases where the vic-
tim sought treatment in an ED.
Victims may have gone to other
health care providers, such as pri-
vate physicians or urgent-care cen-
ters. Third, 26 percent of reports
were missing an injury diagnosis.
Many cases had limited data on the
circumstances of the attack or the
identity of the dog involved.137
Thus, the CDC’s estimates may be
both overinclusive (“just cause”
bites may have been included)138
and underinclusive (insofar as vic-
tims may have sought treatment at
other facilities).
Another CDC study attempted to
identify the incidence of dog bites
in a particular locality: Denver, 
Colorado.139 The authors examined
reports from the Denver Municipal
Animal Shelter in 1991.140 There
were a total of 991 bites during the
study period.141 However, only 178
were eligible for the study,142 as
the authors excluded several cate-
gories of bites: bites involving
household members, attacks invol-
ving multiple dogs, attacks before
1991, dogs who had been owned
for less than six months, cases in
which the owner did not live in
Denver County, attacks where the
owner’s phone number was not
listed on the report, and cases in
which the victim did not receive
medical treatment.143
The study created a control
group of dogs to try to determine
whether certain characteristics
(such as breed) made a dog more
likely to bite.144 Using a multivari-
ate statistical analysis, the study
concluded that biting dogs were
more likely than control dogs to
be German shepherds or Chow
Chows, male, intact (not neu-
tered), and reside in a house with
one or more children.145 Denver
had (and still has) a ban on pit
bulls, so it is not surprising that no
cases involved that breed.146
The authors acknowledged that
their results had several problems.
First, they were only able to speak
to owners of approximately half of
the biting dogs. They excluded
cases in which the victim did not
seek medical attention. In this
respect, the authors believed that
seeking medical attention was a
“surrogate” for “real bites.”147 The
authors did not verify the breeds of
the dogs involved, but, instead,
“identified predominant breed as
whatever breed the owner consid-
ered the dog.”148 Because of the
small number of bites per breed,
the authors could not assess the
statistical significance of breeds
other than German shepherd and
Chow Chow.149
Another CDC study attempted to
determine the frequency of dog
bites by conducting a random tele-
phone survey of households.150 The
authors used the Injury Control and
Risk Survey (ICARIS), a random-
digit-dialing telephone survey.151
They asked each adult respondent
whether he (or his children) had
been bitten by a dog in the previous
twelve months and whether the vic-
tim had sought medical atten-
tion.152 Out of 5,328 completed in-
terviews, ninety-four adults and
ninety-two children reported being
bitten in the previous twelve
months.153 Of these, twelve adults
and twenty-six children sought med-
ical care.154 From these data, the
authors extrapolated that 1.8 per-
cent of the American population
(4,494,083 people) had been bitten
in the previous twelve months, and
0.3 percent had sought medical
attention.155 This shows that nonfa-
tal bites are a public health problem
that “is five orders of magnitude
greater” than fatal dog bites.156 The
study concluded that several factors
had no statistical significance on
the likelihood of being bitten: cen-
sus region, urbanicity, race/ethnic
group, and household income.157
The study did not attempt to corre-
late between the number of bites
and the breed of dog. The authors
acknowledged that the study relied
on the self-reporting of data, which
were not validated, and that they
received a poor response rate (only
56 percent of people responded to
the survey).158
Other Studies
Other studies have attempted to doc-
ument the total number of dog bites
and the number of bites per breed.
A study of ED visits for dog-bite
injuries159 confirmed many of the
conclusions of the previously dis-
cussed CDC study of ED visits.160
The study noted that a lack of a na-
tional reporting system for dog-
bite injuries makes gathering and
analyzing data on the subject diffi-
cult.161 The authors, in reviewing
the literature on the subject, found
that previous studies concluded
that between 0.3 percent and 1.1
percent of all ED visits are due to
dog-bite-related injuries.162 To
determine the true percentage,
they collected data from the Na-
tional Hospital Ambulatory Med-
ical Care Survey (NHAMCS), a ran-
dom surveying instrument that is
used to calculate the number of
ED visits per year.163 They esti-
mated that between 1992 and
1994, 333,687 annual visits were
made to EDs seeking medical
treatment for dog-bite-related
injuries.164 This amounted to 0.4
percent of all ED visits nation-
wide.165 Looking at the monetary
cost of dog bites, they found that
The Case Against Dog Breed Discrimination by Homeowners’ Insurance Companies
32 The State of the Animals IV: 2007
the average cost for a dog-bite-
related ED visit was $274, result-
ing in an annual cost of $102.4
million.166 The study, however, did
not  address  the quest ion of
whether certain breeds are particu-
larly more dangerous than others.
This is partly due to the unavail-
ability of data through NHAMCS.
Moreover, the study most likely
undercounted the number of non-
fatal dog bites because victims may
have sought treatment from places
other than EDs.167
Other studies have attempted to
examine the problem at a more
localized level. A July 1991
study168 found that dog bites were
responsible for 0.3 percent of all
ED visits at The Children’s Hospi-
tal of Philadelphia.169 Of those vis-
its, 77 percent involved cases
where the victim knew the biting
dog.170 The study found one statis-
tically significant conclusion: more
pit bull injuries were the result of
unprovoked attacks as compared
to such attacks by other breeds.171
“Unfortunately, the absence of reli-
able dog breed-specific population
figures prevent[ed] the calculation
of breed-specific injury rates.”172
An October 1997 study tried to
determine the number of dog bites
in Alleghany County, Pennsylvania
(Pittsburgh), by using the “cap-
ture-recapture” method of statisti-
cal analysis.173 The authors found
that 790 dog bites were reported
to the Alleghany County Health
Department in 1993.174 Using the
capture-recapture method, along
with log-linear modeling, the study
concluded that the number of un-
reported dog bites was 1,388 (with
a 95 percent confidence interval of
between 1,010 and 1,925).175 The
authors cautioned, however, that
the self-reporting sources are prob-
lematic in that “whether or not a
case is reported depends largely on
the severity of the event and the
attitude, knowledge, or education
level of the victim.”176 Accordingly,
the authors suggested that the
actual Pittsburgh dog-bite inci-
dence rate must be higher than
that found in the study.177
Another survey178 in Pennsylva-
nia polled children in order to
determine an overall bite rate from
the perspective of bite victims.179
The survey, conducted in 1981,
found that 46.1 percent of children
reported that they had been bitten
by a dog during their lifetime.180
The study concluded that 
[B]eing bitten by a dog is a
rather common occurrence for
children, especially those be-
tween the ages of seven and
twelve years, and the event is
greatly underestimated by offi-
cial bite statistics.181
Nevertheless, the authors did not
attempt to catalog bites per breed.182
Unfortunately, not all scientists
have used statistically sound meth-
ods to draw conclusions about the
relative dangerousness of breeds.
Two physicians, Lee E. Pinckney
and Leslie A. Kennedy, from the
Department of Radiology at the
University of Texas Southwestern
Medical School and Children’s
Medical Center, sent letters to the
editors of 245 major newspapers
requesting copies of all stories
about dog-bite-related fatalities.183
The number of fatalities reported
by the responding newspapers be-
tween March 1966 and June 1980
totaled seventy-four.184 Of the sev-
enty-four fatalities, sixteen were
caused by German shepherds, nine
by  husk i e s ,  e i gh t  b y  Sa in t
Bernards, six each by bull terriers
and Great Danes, and five by mala-
mutes.185 The remaining dog-bite
fatalities were caused by a variety
of breeds, including ten attacks by
mixed breeds and five attacks by
dogs of unknown breeds.186 In
addition to acquiring bite fatality
statistics from newspapers, the
authors used American Kennel
Club (AKC) registration data to
compare the relative number of
fatalities per breed.187
The CDC authors criticized the
Pinckney/Kennedy study as being
“primarily anecdotal” rather than
“systematic” in its approach.188
Indeed, Pinckney and Kennedy con-
ceded that their database was
“incomplete” and “may not be
entirely reliable.”189 Their data
depended on newspaper reports,
which may themselves be incom-
plete or inaccurate. Thus, the
authors said their data required
“cautious interpretation.”190 An
example of such “cautious interpre-
tation” is represented by the
authors’ observation that even
though German shepherds were
involved in more fatalities than any
other breed in the study, such large
frequency could be reflective of the
fact that German shepherds had
the highest AKC registration of any
large breed.191 Hence, the use of
AKC data to draw comparisons
between breeds is problematic,192
as demonstrated by the high num-
ber of registrations for breeds such
as German shepherds, and low
number of registrations for a popu-
lar breed, such as the pit bull.193
William Winkler’s study194 in
1977 has also been criticized for
its lack of scientific method.195 His
“study” involved compiling news
reports from eleven dog-bite-re-
lated fatalities from January 1974
through December 1975.196 From
these data, he made various con-
clusions about the breeds responsi-
ble, finding that, “not unexpect-
edly,” German shepherds were the
breed most often responsible for
fatal dog attacks.197 Because Saint
Bernards were responsible for two
deaths during this twenty-four-
month period, he concluded,
“[t]his relatively uncommon breed
may be a greater hazard than
others.”198
A common thread running
through several studies is the
attempt to extrapolate conclusions
about breeds based on limited
data. For example, an April 2000
epidemiological study in Philadel-
phia used reports from the Depart-
ment of Health to conclude that
between 1995 and 1997 there were
approximately 5,390 bites.199 The
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authors concluded that pit bulls,
German shepherds, and rottweilers
combined were responsible for 59
percent of bites each year.200 The
authors felt comfortable drawing
this conclusion despite the fact
that they could not determine the




Despite all of the research and stud-
ies on the subject, scientists and
veterinarians cannot state with cer-
tainty or confidence why certain
dogs are more aggressive than oth-
ers.202 It seems that a particular
dog may be aggressive because of a
variety of factors.203 According to
the American Veterinary Medical
Association’s multidisciplinary Task
Force on Canine Aggression and
Human-Canine Interactions, “A
dog’s tendency to bite depends on
at least five interacting factors:
heredity, early experience, later so-
cialization and training, health
(medical and behavioral), and vic-
tim behavior.”204
While breed (as an inherited
characteristic) is one component
of predicting a dog’s dangerous-
ness, it is not the only factor.205
There is no way to scientifically
determine whether a dog is likely
to bite in the future, any more
than psychologists can predict
whether certain people will com-
mit crimes of violence. The excep-
tion to this rule is the axiom that
the best predictor of future behav-
ior is past behavior. For this rea-
son, many veterinary and scientific
groups support “dangerous dog
laws” that target individual dogs
who have demonstrated a propen-
sity to bite or attack innocent 
victims.206 The problem with BSL
and breed discrimination is that
legislatures and insurers have
attempted to prophylactically deter-
mine which breeds are most likely






To date, no scientific study has
been able to resolve what I term to
be the problem of “numerators
and denominators.” A person wish-
ing to determine whether certain
breeds are more likely to bite than
others must first determine the
number of bites per breed (the
numerator) and then compare that
number to the total number of
dogs of that breed in the general
population (the denominator).
This can be expressed as a ratio:
This ratio (RDR) allows for a
comparison between breeds. The
higher the RDR, the greater pro-
clivity a particular breed has to
bite. It allows for a comparison of
“oranges to oranges” and “apples
to apples.” Otherwise, it is likely
that highly popular breeds will
appear to be more dangerous,
when in fact the number of bites is
reflective of the overall population
of the particular breed. 
A study that tried to extrapolate
breed data from the previously dis-
cussed CDC studies agreed that
the proper method for determin-
ing a breed’s dangerousness was
the use of a comparative ratio:
Ideally, breed-specific bite rates
would be calculated to compare
breed and quantify the relative
dangerousness of each breed.
For example, 10 fatal attacks by
Breed X relative to a population
of 10,000 X’s (1/1,000) imply a
greater risk than 100 attacks by
Breed Y relative to a population
of 1,000,000 Y’s (0.1/1,000).
Without consideration of the
population sizes, Breed Y would
be perceived to be the more
dangerous breed on the basis of
the number of fatalities.207
Using the RDR normalizes the
effect of a breed’s popularity, or
lack thereof. Dogs of popular
breeds are going to bite more
often simply because there are
more of them.208 A January 1997
article warned that, as dalmatians
become more popular, people
should expect to see more bites
from that breed.209 This is not to
say that dalmatians are inherently
more dangerous than other breeds.
Rather, an increase in their popula-
tion should also result in a propor-
tional increase in bites from that
breed.210 Similarly, the Pinckney/
Kennedy study211 cautioned that,
despite the fact that German shep-
herds accounted for the most num-
ber of deaths, their finding must
be read in conjunction with the
popularity of the breed, as evi-
denced by AKC registrations of the
same time period.212
The problem of numerators and
denominators is that it is diffi-
cult—if not impossible—to accu-
rately determine the number of
bites per breed and the number of
dogs in a particular breed. Without
an accurate count for either the
numerator or denominator, one
runs the risk of stigmatizing an
entire breed as “overly dangerous”
based on the breed’s absolute num-
ber of bites, instead of examining
the breed’s number of bites rela-
tive to its overall population.
The Numerator Problem
The principal problem in determin-
ing the total number of bites by 
a particular breed is that there is no
national reporting system for dog
bites.213 The CDC studies214 demon-
strate that, while fatal dog bites are
easier to track than nonfatal bites,
even the methodology used to
uncover fatalities misses approxi-
mately 26 percent of cases.215
Further, news accounts—on which
the CDC relied, in part, to deter-
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Dangerousness  =    
Ratio
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mine the number of fatal dog bites
and the breeds involved—may be
biased toward reporting attacks by
certain breeds.216
The numerator may also be
biased against dogs who cause
more damage, while ignoring
breeds that bite more often but do
not cause victims to seek emer-
gency treatment.217 If a dog bite
does not cause serious injury, it is
not likely that the victim would
seek medical treatment.218 This
then skews the results of studies
that use emergency department
visits to track the incidence of dog
bites.219 “The problem with self-
reporting sources is that whether
or not a case is reported depends
largely on the severity of the event
and the attitude, knowledge, or ed-
ucation level of the victim.”220
Studies that have used random
sampling221 are equally problem-
atic because they, too, depend on
accurate self-reporting of their
sample groups. The low response
rates of these studies also lead to
questions about the accuracy of




No one knows how many dogs are
present in the United States at any
one time. This should not be sur-
prising, as even the constitution-
ally mandated223 decennial census
of human beings is known to un-
dercount people.224
Determining the true number, or
even an accurate estimate, of dogs
can be problematic. While many
dogs are kept as household pets,225
others are used as service animals
or guard dogs; kept in animal shel-
ters or animal stores; or simply
allowed to wander the streets as
strays. The dog population is con-
stantly changing and moving,
which makes obtaining an accurate
count difficult and expensive.
Even if it was possible to deter-
mine how many dogs exist in the
country at any one time, the prob-
lem then becomes how to deter-
mine how many of those dogs be-
long to each breed. Determining
the breed of one dog is difficult
enough.226 To take a census of all
dogs and identify their breeds
would be an impossible task. 
Some scientists have suggested
using AKC or municipal registra-
tion data to determine the number
of dogs in a particular breed in a
particular community.227 However,
one study concluded that city reg-
istrations account for only 29.1
percent of all dogs.228 Further,
owners of breeds considered “dan-
gerous” may be reluctant to regis-
ter their animals.229 This may be
particularly true of dogs used for
illicit purposes, such as those
owned by drug dealers, dogfight-
ers, and gang members.230
AKC registration data is also
problematic because the AKC only
registers purebred dogs231 and
depends on owners taking the ini-
tiative to register their dogs.232
Mixed breeds, for which there are
numerous combinations, are not
eligible for registration.233 Pit bulls
are often registered with organiza-
tions other than the AKC. If owners
do register them, they register
with the United Kennel Club or the
American Dog Breeders Associa-
tion.234 If a breed is undercounted
in the denominator of the ratio, it
will make a breed appear more
dangerous than it actually is.235
The Problem 
of Breeds
Breed is a human construct that is
used to conveniently group dogs
based on similar physical character-
istics.236 There is no scientific test
to determine a dog’s breed.237 The
only way to determine a dog’s breed
is to examine its heredity. This task
is made possible but is expensive
and time-consuming,238 if a dog is
registered with the AKC.239
As examples of the problem of
defining and identifying breed,
consider the case of huskies and
pit bulls. “Husky” refers to a class
of dogs, not any one particular
breed. Siberian huskies, Alaskan
malamutes, and Samoyeds are all
considered to belong to the
“husky” family, yet they are all dif-
ferent breeds.240 Similarly, there is
no AKC-standard breed called “pit
bull.” “Pit bull” is a collective clas-
sification of the American Stafford-
shire terrier, Staffordshire pit bull
terrier, and bull terrier.241
Scientists have not been able to
determine if victims of dog bites
can accurately report the breeds of
dogs that attacked them. Many sci-
entists, particularly the CDC
authors, have stated that misiden-
tification is a likely problem, espe-
cially under the stress of a dog
attack.242 Part of the problem may
be that as a particular breed gets
a reputation for dangerousness,
some victims jump to the conclu-
sion that they were bitten by a dog
of that breed.243
Even under ordinary, low-stress
conditions, many people have diffi-
culty identifying a dog’s breed.
For the average person any-
thing with prick ears and blue
eyes automatically becomes a
“husky”....Any smooth coated
brown dog, medium sized, and
muscular  becomes a “pit
bull”....Any tall dog becomes a
Great Dane, fuzzy or hairy, and
it’s a Chow Chow. If it’s black
and tan and heavy, it’s a rot-
tweiler, etc.244
One survey of bite reports found
that medium-size black and tan ani-
mals were likely to be recorded as
German shepherds. Stocky, short-
haired dogs were listed as pit bulls.
Media reports of pit bull attacks are
often accompanied by pictures of
boxers or pugs instead of American
Staffordshire terriers.245 One enter-
taining website, called “Find the 
pit bull,” displays twenty-one pic-
tures of purebred dogs and chal-
lenges the user to identify the pit
bull among them.246
Even veterinarians and other
experts have difficulty determining
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whether a particular dog belongs to
a particular breed.247 This was a cen-
tral concern of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Ameri-
can Dog Owners Association v. City
of Lynn.248 The Court declared the
city of Lynn’s pit bull ordinance to
be unconstitutional in part because
the animal-control officers desig-
nated to enforce the ordinance used
conflicting and subjective standards
to determine and identify breed.249
The problem of mixed breed
complicates the issue even further.
In determining a relative danger-
ousness ratio, it is unclear how to
count mixed breeds.250 Should they
be counted once per breed? Not at
all? Create a new category for each
possible combination of breeds?
Aside from how to use the raw data
on attacks by mixed breed, there is
the additional problem of misiden-
tification by laypeople.251 Victims
sometimes inadvertently report
mixed-breed dogs as purebreds252
due to the heat of the moment and
their lack of training in identifying
subtle breed characteristics.
There is good reason to believe
that the raw data being used to cal-
culate relative dangerousness
ratios are incomplete and inaccu-
rate. If the data being input into
the calculation are flawed, the re-
sults (claiming to show some
breeds are more dangerous than
others) are equally flawed.253
The Problem of
“Just Cause” Bites
Even if an accurate count could be
obtained of the number of bites per
breed, there is the additional prob-
lem of how to handle “just cause”
bites in the resulting statistics. If
the purpose is to determine which
breeds are inherently more danger-
ous, just by virtue of the breeds
themselves, then the statistics
should exclude bites by the dog that
were justified. If a rottweiler bites
an intruder who is attacking the
homeowner, we would expect the
rottweiler to be praised for defend-
ing its owner. This is not the type of
bite that we should be trying to pre-
vent. It is also not the type of bite
that is likely to lead to an insurance
claim. Similarly, if a dog is being
physically tormented by a neighbor-
hood child who is poking it in the
eye, we would not deny that the dog
has an inherent right to defend
itself by growling, snarling, barking,
or biting back.254 These are “just
cause” bites, bites in which the dog
has a legitimate reason to defend
itself or its owners.
It is possible that the statistics
are being skewed because property
owners who wish to purchase
“guard dogs” may be self-selecting
certain breeds based on the popular
notions of relative dangerousness.
Guard dogs are trained to protect
property by scaring away would-be
intruders and, if necessary, to bite
an actual trespasser. Owners who
desire to have guard dogs may
rationalize the purchase of one
breed over another based on the
degree to which they subjectively
believe that the dog will be “mean”
or “scary.” This creates a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy. The “scarier” a breed
is considered by a community, the
more likely a dog of that breed will
be purchased for protection, used
for protection, and actually bite an
intruder. This will skew the statis-
tics in a way that purports to show
that the particular breed is, in fact,
inherently more dangerous.
Despite these concerns,  it
appears that the studies to date
have not excluded this category of
bites from their datasets.255 This is
a fatal flaw in the statistics, for it
confuses the issue between inher-
ent dangerousness (due to breed)
and legitimate animal behavior.
Breed Switching
by Bad Owners
Assume for the moment that an
accurate relative dangerousness
ratio could be determined for each
breed, and that it could be scientif-
ically determined that certain
breeds are inherently more danger-
ous than others. What about the
owners? Does this not excuse them
from the responsibility to properly
train and care for their pets?  
The reality is that there is a wide
spectrum of responsible pet owner-
ship. For some people, occasionally
providing food and water for a dog
is considered sufficient. On the
opposite end of the spectrum,
some people spend thousands of
dollars on luxuries such as pet
spas, advanced dog agility classes,
and elaborate beds. Somewhere in
the middle of the spectrum are
people who actively ensure that
their pets have food, water, and
shelter; get exercise; are well
trained; and receive adequate vet-
erinary care.256
Unfortunately, a small percent-
age of pet owners breed and use
their pets for illicit purposes. They
intentionally seek out vicious dogs
who will attack and maim humans
and other animals.257 Dogfighting
enthusiasts, gang members, and
drug dealers will purposely select,
breed, and train dogs to be vicious.
The purpose may be to intimidate
rivals (in the case of gangs and
drug dealers), to defend illegal
drugs (in the case of drug dealers),
or to make money (in the case of
promoters of dogfights).258 For
some, having a vicious dog is sim-
ply a status symbol.259 In order to
make dogs into vicious weapons,
they use “revolting and painful
techniques to bring the animals to
the verge of bloodlust.”260 Drug
dealers in Philadelphia during the
1980s had pit bulls named “Mur-
der, Hitler, and Scarface.”261 They
wore collars that concealed crack,
cocaine, and money.262 In Chicago,
gang members “brandish[ed] their
fierce pit bulls just as they would a
switchblade or a gun.”263
Current statistics do not take in-
to consideration the degree to
which the source of a dog’s aggres-
siveness is the torturous upbringing
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described above, as opposed to the
dog’s breed.264 In those situations,
the problem is clearly with the dog
owner—not the dog itself or its
breed. These problem owners are
dangerous with any breed of dog.265
One solution would be for insur-
ers to write policies that exclude
injuries related to dogfighting. This
would limit the claims paid out for
these high-risk animals, yet it would
leave potential plaintiffs without an
adequate source of compensation.
This result might be a socially
acceptable solution because of the
unclean hands of the “victims.” If
dogfighting exclusions are incorpo-
rated into standard homeowners’
insurance contracts, the language
should be narrowly written to
exclude only those bad faith actors
who, as a matter of social policy,
should not be rewarded or compen-
sated for injuries attendant to an
illegal activity. The key would be to
write language that would still pro-
tect innocent passersby.
One of the arguments against
BSL is that once a breed becomes
banned, problem owners will sim-
ply switch to another breed.266 In
the 1930s, pit bulls were far from
considered a “vicious breed.” In
fact,  a pit bull  named “Pete”
starred in the Our Gang films of
the time.267 Fifty years ago the
Doberman was considered the
most vicious dog.268 During the
1980s the focus turned to pit
bulls.269 In short, today’s public
target may be tomorrow’s favorite




It is quite possible that one or
more insurance companies have
their own proprietary data purport-
ing to show that one breed or
another is disproportionately re-
sponsible for bites. I am skeptical
that their data would be any better
than the CDC’s. The problems
associated with the CDC and non-
CDC studies are inherent to the
problem of trying to determine the
number of bites per breed and the




Breed discrimination by insurance
companies and breed-specific leg-
islation by state and local gov-
ernments have attracted natio-
nal attention and outrage by vet-
erinarians, animal groups, and
dog owners.
The American Veterinary Med-
ical Association’s Task Force on
Canine Aggression concluded that
BSL and other breed-specific
actions are “inappropriate and
ineffective.”270 The Task Force con-
sisted of a diverse coalition of vet-
erinarians, academics, physicians,
insurers, representatives from ani-
mal rights advocates, CDC scien-
tists, and lawyers.271 The Task
Force agreed that to properly de-
termine the relative dangerousness
of breeds, one must first determine
the number of bites per breed and
the total population of each breed.
As noted above,272 the accurate
calculation of both numbers is an
immense challenge.273
The Task Force rejected the no-
tion that a dog’s breed is the sole
determinant of dangerousness.
“[A] dog’s tendency to bite de-
pends on at least five interacting
factors: heredity, early experience,
later socialization and training,
health (medical and behavioral),
and victim behavior.”274 They 
also pointed to the problems of
mixed breeds, misidentification of
breeds, and shifting popularity of
breeds.275 The Task Force also ex-
pressed concern about making de-
cisions based solely on breed, since
there is a lack of scientific means
to identify breed.276 The Task Force
recommended, instead, that local
governments focus on individual
dogs and dog owners.277
The very scientists who have
authored studies trying to deter-
mine a link between breed and
aggressiveness oppose breed dis-
crimination and BSL. In many 
of the CDC studies, the scientists
cautioned against using their in-
complete data on attacks to make
knee-jerk legislative or policy deci-
sions based solely on breed.278
They pointed to the lack of reliable
data on bites  per breed (the
“numerator problem”) and the
absence of a reliable count of dogs
per breed (the “denominator prob-
lem”).279
Animal groups have also opposed
BSL and breed discrimination. The
AKC has taken a strong stance
against breed discrimination by in-
surance companies: 
The American Kennel Club
believes that insurance compa-
nies should determine cover-
age of a dog-owning household
based on the dog’s deeds, not
the dog’s breeds. If a dog is a
well-behaved member of the
household and the community,
there is no reason to deny or
cancel coverage. In fact, insur-
ance companies should con-
sider a dog an asset, a natural
alarm system whose bark may
deter intruders and prevent
potential theft.280
The AKC also issued this state-
ment concerning BSL:
The American Kennel Club
(AKC) strongly supports dan-
gerous-dog control. Dog-con-
trol legislation must be reason-
able, non-discriminatory, and
enforceable as detailed in the
AKC Position Statement.
To provide communities
with the most effective danger-
ous-dog control possible, laws
must not be breed specific.
Instead of holding all dog own-
ers accountable for their be-
havior, breed specific laws
place restrictions only on the
owners of certain breeds of
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dogs. If specific breeds are
banned ,  owners  o f  these
breeds intent on using their
dogs for malicious purposes,
such as dog fighting or crimi-
nal activities, will  simply
change to another breed of
dog and continue to jeopard-
ize public safety.281
In response to a perceived rise in
breed discrimination, The HSUS
and the ASPCA developed a grass-
roots campaign to educate the in-
surance industry.282 Both groups
oppose breed discrimination.283
Other groups that have spoken out
against breed discrimination in-
clude the American Veterinary
Medical Association, the American
Dog Owners Association, the West-
minster Kennel Club, and the
American Humane Association.284
IV. The Unique 
and Special Role 
of Pets in Society
For at least twelve thousand years,
the history of the domestic dog,
Canis familiaris, has been inter-
t w i n e d  w i t h  t h a t  o f  h u m a n
beings.285 The law has generally
treated dogs as  mere prop-
erty286—or worse, as nonprop-
erty.287 As the popularity of dogs
as pets has grown, the law has
responded in kind by recognizing
the importance of dogs, cats, and
other pets. The insurance indus-
try, by practicing breed discrimi-
nation, has failed to appreciate
the unique and special role of
dogs to their owners and to soci-
ety. This section is offered to pro-
vide some context for the implica-
tions of breed discrimination.
This is a problem that has the
potential for affecting a large seg-
ment of the population and for
having damaging effects on the





A study estimated that in 1998
there would be 53.6 million dogs
in the United States, a 2.1 percent
increase since 1991.288 Approxi-
mately 34.3 percent of homes have
one or more dogs.289 Dog owners
are thus a significant portion of
the United States population.
They are also a significant pool of
customers (actual and potential)
for insurers. 
Spending
To understand the scope and
power of the pet-owning popula-
tion, consider the amount of
money that is spent on pets each
year. In 1998, Americans spent
$11.1 billion on veterinary care
alone, a 61 percent increase from
1991.290 There are more than 35
“pet vacation resorts” where dogs
and cats can go to be pampered.291
There are also more than 650 
pet cemeteries in the United
States, indicating the extent to
which owners will go to memorial-
ize their pets.292
Dogs: Members of 
the American Family
Breed discrimination ignores the
reality that most pet owners con-
sider their pets to be members of
their immediate family.293 Indeed,
this “coexistence has contributed
substantially to humans’ quality of
life.”294 Dogs were initially domes-
ticated to be work animals, assist-
ing humans with farming, herding
livestock, and providing security at
night.295 In time, dogs became
“four-legged members of the fam-
ily.”296 Some dogs provide assis-
tance to humans with disabili-
ties.297 Service dogs serve as a
tangible resource for people, not
just a source of companionship.298
Dogs can have positive effects on
the health of their owners,299 such
as alleviating loneliness and de-
pression, reducing high blood pres-
sure, and addressing obesity.300 On
the other hand, these effects must
be balanced against the negative
health effects of dogs, such as bites
and the transmission of zoonotic
diseases.301 When the positives are
weighed against the negatives, at
least one physician has concluded
that dogs probably are beneficial to
human health.302 Some owners will
forgo their own health in order to
care for their pets—a demonstra-
tion of how much pets mean to
some owners. “Most physicians are
familiar with at least one example
of a person refusing hospitaliza-
tion...because there was no one
else in the home to care for their
pet.”303
The loss of a pet can have pro-
found effects on an owner. A num-
ber of organizations provide
bereavement support for people
whose pets have died,304 and at
least three greeting card compa-
nies make sympathy cards specifi-
cally for the loss of a pet.305
Breed discrimination forces pet
owners to choose between their
homes and their dogs. Forcing
owners to make this choice repre-
sents a significant misunderstand-
ing of the role of pets in our soci-
ety. For some pet owners, giving up





When a dog bites, it can have lasting
consequences for both the dog and
its owner’s family. When an insur-
ance company refuses to insure or
renew a household based on a par-
ticular breed of dog, it, too, can have
far-reaching consequences.
Most people do not respond
appropriately if their dog bites
someone. Most punishment is too
severe and too late to be of any
value to the dog in preventing
future occurrences.306 The dog is
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usually isolated from the family
and visitors. By limiting inter-
action with humans, the dog
does not learn how to deal with
people appropriately.307 Isolation
may also lead to inadequate med-
ical care, which may in turn lead
to serious health problems for 
the dog.308
Some owners abandon their
dogs or euthanize them either out
of frustration at not being able to
correct aggressive behavior or be-
cause an insurance company tells
them to do so in order to get
homeowners’ insurance.309 When
BSL goes into effect or insurance
companies discriminate, it causes
some owners to purposely assume
a sheltered and low profile in the
community to avoid being caught
with an unauthorized pet.310 Shel-
ter drop-offs are common after
BSL goes into effect or insurers
begin to discriminate based on
breed.311 The humane society in
Atchison, Kansas, reported a 40
percent increase in drop-offs of rot-
tweilers because of breed discrimi-
nation.312 This is unfortunate be-
cause many shelters can only keep
dogs a certain number of days
before euthanizing them. Breed
discrimination can have a chilling
effect on ownership of certain
breeds,313 which means certain
breeds are not likely to be adopted
and will have to be euthanized.
Breed discrimination will likely
have an effect on homeownership
in states that permit this practice.
Homeowners’ insurance is the
“gatekeeper” to homeownership.
Without homeowners’ insurance,
a person cannot get a mortgage.
Without a mortgage, most people
cannot buy a house.314 An insured
who chooses to lie about a dog’s
breed or the existence of a dog
altogether is committing policy
fraud, running the risk of criminal
prosecution315 and the complete
cancellation of his or her policy.316
Pets: More than
Mere Property
The problem of breed discrimina-
tion should be viewed in light of
modern developments in animal
law, which is beginning to recognize
that animals are more than mere
property. Until recently, the legal
status of animals was governed by
an 1897 Supreme Court case,
Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co.317
The case involved a Newfoundland
named Countess Lona who was
killed by a railroad car.318 Her owner
brought suit against the railroad for
negligence. The railroad defended
by relying on a statute that prohib-
ited an owner from recovering for
more than the declared value on the
animal’s registration form.319 An
owner whose dog was not registered
could not recover anything for the
loss of or damage to the animal.320
Countess Lona’s owner brought
suit, challenging the constitutional-
ity of the law.321
The Supreme Court held that the
statute was constitutional as a valid
exercise of the state’s police
power.322 The Court declared that
dogs are a form of quasi-property
that is “imperfect or qualified” in
nature.323 The Court relied on the
common law rule that dogs could
not constitute stolen property for
purposes of larceny statutes.324 The
common law held that wild animals
had no property value until killed
or subdued.325 Domesticated ani-
mals, such as horses, cattle, sheep,
and other “work” animals, were
considered “perfect and complete”
property.326 Dogs fell in a third cat-
egory, that of “cats, monkeys, par-
rots, singing birds, and similar ani-
mals, kept for pleasure, curiosity,
or caprice.”327 The Court saw no
useful, social value for dogs, except
for companionship, which the
Court dismissed as unsatisfactory
for the establishment of a property
interest. Thus, the Court held that
property interests in animals are on
a continuum: wild animals (animals
ferae naturae) on one end, domes-
ticated animals (such as horses,
cattle, and sheep) on the other
end, and dogs somewhere in be-
tween.328 To the Sentell Court,
dogs hold “their lives at the will of
the legislature, and properly fall-
ing within the police powers of the
several states.”329 The Court con-
cluded, “It is purely within the 
discretion of the legislature to say
how far dogs shall be recognized
as property, and under what re-
strictions they shall be permitted
to roam the streets.”330
The question of the legal status
of dogs and other pets has recently
been addressed by courts in the
context of family disputes. Bennett
v. Bennett331 and Arrington v.
Arrington332 typify the majority
rule with respect to the “custody”
of pets upon their owners’ divorce.
In both cases, divorcing couples
sought both custody and visitation
of their dogs. In Bennett the trial
court awarded legal custody of the
dog, Roddy, to the husband, with
the wife receiving every-other-
weekend and holiday visitation
rights.333 Subsequent squabbling
between the parties led the Court
to modify its order to have the par-
ties swap custody of the dog every
month.334 The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s order and
affirmed the Sentell doctrine:
“While a dog may be considered by
many to be a member of the family,
under Florida law, animals are con-
sidered to be personal property.”335
The court found that the trial
court lacked authority to order vis-
itation rights in mere property.336
The court in Arrington reached
a similar conclusion. Arrington in-
volved a custody dispute over Bon-
nie Lou, “a very fortunate little
dog with two humans to shower
upon her attentions and genuine
love frequently not received by
human  ch i l d r en  f rom the i r
divorced parents.”337 The trial
court had awarded custody of Bon-
nie Lou to Mrs. Arrington. Mr.
Arrington appealed, claiming he
should have been appointed “man-
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aging conser vator” (primar y
guardian) of Bonnie Lou.338 The
Court held that managing conser-
vatorships were designed for hu-
mans, not animals.339 The Court
held, “A dog, for all its admirable
and unique qualities, is not a
human being and is not treated in
the law as such....A dog is personal
property, ownership of which is
recognized under the law.”340
There is an indication that the
legal status of dogs and other pets
may be beginning to change. In
Raymond v. Lachmann, the court
had to determine the custody of a
cat named Merlin.341 The defen-
dant originally owned Merlin, but
left him for one and a half years
with a former roommate, the plain-
tiff.342 During that time, the plain-
tiff renamed him “Lovey” and grew
to be quite attached to him.343 The
trial and appellate courts both
held that Lovey should remain in
the custody of the plaintiff, who
had taken care of him for a lengthy
period of time. What is remarkable
about this case is that the court
used a “best interests of the cat”
standard to decide the issue. The
court discarded strict application
of property law and in its place
adopted a version of the “best
interests of the child” standard
from (human) family law. The
court held:
Cognizant of the cherished
status accorded to pets in our
society, the strong emotions
engendered by disputes of this
nature, and the limited ability
of the courts to resolve them
satisfactorily, on the record
presented, we think it best for
all concerned that, given his
limited life expectancy, Lovey,
who is now almost ten years
old, remain where he has lived,
prospered, loved, and been
loved for the past four years.344
Some courts have also recog-
nized that pets are more than
mere property in the context of
tort awards. In Corso v. Crawford
Dog & Cat Hospital, Inc.,345 a New
York City civil court judge awarded
$700 in damages to the owner of a
deceased poodle. The dog had
been euthanized by the defendant,
on instructions from the plain-
tiff.346 “The plaintiff had arranged
for an elaborate funeral...includ-
ing a headstone, an epitaph, and
attendance by plaintiff ’s two sis-
ters and a friend.”347 When the
plaintiff opened the casket, how-
ever, she saw the body of a dead
cat.348 She brought suit, alleging
that she had suffered emotional
distress as a result of the inci-
dent.349 The Court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to sue not
just for the market value of the
dog (for conversion of her prop-
erty) but also for her mental
anguish and suffering in seeing
the cat instead of her dog. The
Court stated:
This court now overrules prior
precedent and holds that a pet
is not just a thing but occupies
a special place somewhere in
between a person and a piece
of personal property....A pet is
not an inanimate thing that
just receives affection it also
returns it....To say that [the
poodle] is a piece of personal
property and no more is a re-
pudiation of our humanness.
This I cannot accept.350
Dicta in other cases demon-
strate that courts are beginning to
rethink the concept that pets are
mere property. In Bueckner v.
Hamel,351 the Texas Court of
Appeals had to decide the amount
of damages to be awarded the
owner of then-deceased dogs, a
dalmatian and an Australian shep-
herd.352 The defendant shot the
dogs while they were chasing a
deer.353 The plaintiffs brought suit
to recover damages for the loss of
their property, which the trial
court found “had special value to
the Plaintiffs and were loved as
pets by the Plaintiffs.”354 The
majority concluded that “Texas
law recognizes a dog as personal
property”355—a holding consis-
tent with Sentell. The majority
went on to hold that the plaintiffs
could recover only for the loss of
value of prospective puppies but
only in the context of how much
the animal itself would be worth
as breeding stock.356
A concurring judge took a
broader view of damages in the
case. He said the award for dam-
ages should be based on “the
intrinsic or special value of domes-
tic animals as companions and be-
loved pets.”357 The market value
was inadequate to compensate the
plaintiffs for the full extent of their
loss.358 “It is common knowledge
among pet owners that the death
of a beloved dog or cat...can be a
great loss.”359 He called for the
acknowledgment of pets as a spe-
cial form of property360 based on
the relationship between humans
and their pets:
Many people who love and
admire dogs as family mem-
bers do so because of the traits
that dogs often embody. These
represent some of the best of
human traits, including loy-
alty, trust, courage, playful-
ness, and love. This cannot be
said of inanimate property. At
the same time, dogs typically
lack the worst human traits,
including avarice, apathy, pet-
tiness, and hatred....Losing a
beloved pet is not the same as
losing an inanimate object,
however cherished it may be.
Even an heirloom of great sen-
timental value, if lost, does not
constitute a loss comparable
to that of a living being. This
d i s t inct ion  app l ies  even
though the deceased living be-
ing is a nonhuman.361
Juries have been following this
trend. In cases where harm had
been done to pets, juries have been
awarding damages as high as
$35,000. In contrast, the average
award in the early 1990s was only a
few hundred dollars.362
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A central principle of insurance
law is that insurance companies
operate at the pleasure of the
states.363 “Indeed, the organiza-
tion of an insurance company and
the conduct of the business of writ-
ing insurance is not a right but a
privilege granted by the State sub-
ject to the conditions imposed by
it to promote the public wel-
fare.”364 The power to regulate in-
surance is so strong that a state
may take over the entire business
of insurance if it decides it is in the
public interest to do so.365
States have the power to regulate
insurers as an exercise of their po-
lice power.366 Although insurance
law is governed in part by contract
law,367 it is also quasi-public in na-
ture.368 States have the power not
just to regulate insurance con-
tracts, but also to declare the
terms and conditions of those con-
tracts and to impose additional
duties and obligations.369 On the
other hand, when a state does not
regulate a particular practice of the
insurance industry, companies are
free to contract as they see fit.370
States regulate and legislate
insurance on behalf of the public
interest. Regulations counterbal-
ance free market forces to protect
the public at large.371 Some states
prohibit unfair and deceptive trade
practices.372 Some administra-
tively set rates.373 In determining
whether a rate is reasonable, states
will look to see if the rate is based
on “legitimate cost factors.”374
Some states require insurers to
write policies for particular risks,
even though the marketplace may
have determined such insureds are
poor risks or that they are simply
uninsurable.375
In 1997 D.S. Hellman evaluated
the widespread practice of the
time of insurers in denying health,
life, and disability coverage to vic-
tims of domestic abuse.376 She pre-
sented a compelling and detailed
analysis of the philosophical and
legal implications of this practice,
ultimately concluding that state
legislatures should intervene and
prevent underwriting decisions
based on a customer’s history of
domestic abuse.377
Hellman’s analysis started with
the premise that insurers had been
able to draw an actuarially justified
conclusion that domestic abuse
victims were, from a statistical
standpoint, more likely than oth-
ers to be victimized in the future
and, thus, to result in claims
against their insurers.378 Domestic
abuse victims were a higher risk—
so high, the insurers concluded,
that the insurance pool could not
bear to have them as a risk, no
matter how high the premium.379
Breed discrimination is an entirely
different problem altogether.
There is a lack of statistically and
scientifically sound data to show
that certain breeds are more dan-
gerous than others. Even if such
data existed, a plausible case could
be made that the breed of a fam-
ily’s dog should not be used as a
factor in underwriting. 
Insurers’ Duty
In making underwriting decisions,
insurers decide which of many
risks to insure in order to protect
their fiscal solvency and profitabil-
ity.380 When an underwriter de-
cides not to insure a particular
risk, the would-be insured is left to
find insurance elsewhere. If no
insurer will underwrite or accept
the risk, the result may be a cost-
shifting to society381 or the loss
of an economic opportunity to a
consumer.382
The question then becomes
which factors an insurer may con-
sider in making its underwriting
decisions. Insurance is a highly
regulated industry. It does not
operate in a regulatory vacuum,
free to let the give-and-take of the
marketplace decide who gets in-
surance, how much coverage they
get, and how much it will cost
them. There is social utility in
making insurance available to the
highest number of people possi-
ble.383 Insurance allows people to
buy homes, afford health care, and
drive automobiles.384 The high
stakes and high social utility of
insurance have historically justi-
fied strict government regulation
of the industry.385
All states require underwriting
decisions to be based on actuari-
ally sound data.386 In Maryland, 
for example, 
An insurer or insurance pro-
ducer may not cancel or refuse
to underwrite or renew a partic-
ular insurance risk or class of
risk for a reason based wholly or
partly on race, color, creed, sex,
or blindness of an applicant or
policyholder or for any arbi-
trary, capricious, or unfairly
discriminatory reason.387
Maryland law also provides that
underwriting must be accom-
plished “by the application of stan-
dards that are reasonably related
to the insurer’s economic and busi-
ness purposes.”388
Actuarially justified underwrit-
ing is not only the law, it is good
business. By accurately separating
out risks into “not insurable” and
“insurable” (and, then, in turn,
separating out insurable risks into
various risk classifications), actu-
arially justified underwriting pro-
motes efficiency and profit. Con-
sumers are not allowed into the
insurance pool when the likelihood
of loss is so high that inclusion of
their risks threatens the viability 
of the pool itself.389 For those in-
sureds allowed in the pool, actuar-
ially justified underwriting pro-
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motes efficiency by assigning low
premiums to low-risk insureds and
high premiums to insureds more
likely to have a claim.390 This cre-
ates a market incentive for low-risk
insureds to participate in the pool
as opposed to engaging in adverse
selection.391 Accurate risk classifi-
cation also maximizes profits for
the insurer. By eliminating the
highest-risk insureds from the
pool, an insurer keeps premiums
low for the low-risk insureds who
remain. An insurer that does not
maintain its “classification edge”
faces the potential of having its
low-risk insureds leave to join
other companies that are able to
charge lower premiums due to bet-
ter risk classification decisions.392
The insurer is stuck with its high-
risk insureds as well as the high-
risk insureds who migrate over
from the insurer’s competition.393
This means that the insurer is not
maximizing its profitability. 
How much statistical correlation
is required for a rating factor to be
“actuarially fair”? How legitimate
do “legitimate cost factors” have
to be?394 Certainly, perfect 1:1 cor-
relation is not required.395 Thus, I
do not suggest that insurers must
be able to demonstrate that every
Chow Chow will have an unjust bite
in its lifetime. Risk classification
necessarily will involve some “false
positives.”396 Otherwise, insurers
would be very limited in the classi-
fications they could use, there
would be insufficient stratification
of the rate pool, and the dangers of
moral hazard397 and adverse selec-
tion398 would increase dramati-
cally. On the other end of the spec-
trum is the insurers’ position, that
any correlation is sufficient.399
This is not an economically viable
position for an insurer, since low-
risk insureds may be incorrectly
classified as high-risk customers,
and high-risk insureds might be
priced out altogether.400 For exam-
ple, my ownership of a rottweiler
and a half-Chow put me in an irra-
tionally high-risk classification—so
high that every insurer except the
Farm Bureau declined to provide
coverage. The dozen or so insurers
that I contacted in Lubbock who
declined to provide coverage lost
out on what would otherwise be a
low-risk insured, simply because
they adhered to a hypothesis (rott-
weilers and Chow Chows are more
dangerous than other dogs) that
has not been scientifically proven.
In my case, the insurer who used a
more actuarially sound rate classi-
f ication structure (the Farm
Bureau) benefited by offering a
low-risk consumer a low-risk pre-
mium, thus gaining a market ad-
vantage over its competition.401
I do not believe there exist suffi-
cient data for an insurer to even
justify a weak correlation between
breed and bite risk. Insurers should
work to minimize the risk of false
positives so as to “fine tune” their
risk classifications to the greatest
extent possible.402 Risk classifica-
tions should be sufficiently refined
so as not to be overbroad. Exclud-
ing all dogs would clearly be over-
broad and would come with high
social costs. Excluding some breeds
is also unsound, based on my review
of the scientific literature.403 What
I propose—and what the Task Force
on Canine Aggression and Human-
Canine Interactions proposed404—
is the refinement of breed-specific
actions by legislatures and insurers
to control and regulate “dangerous
dogs.” Dangerous dogs are those
who have demonstrated (on an
individual, dog-by-dog basis) a pro-
pensity for violence. This would be
actuarially fair because adequate
evidence exists that a dog with a
history of unjustified bites is likely
to be dangerous in the future.
As demonstrated in Part II, there
is insufficient evidence to support
the insurance industry’s argument
that certain breeds bite more often.
In other words, the current risk
classification (by breed) is too gen-
eral and is generating too many
false positives while at the same
time having unnecessary social
costs. A spokesperson for the III
recently conceded, “[T]he industry
isn’t positioned to determine which
dogs should be deemed vicious....
[W]e’re certainly not dog experts or
veterinarians.”405 Unless and until
the industry can demonstrate that
different breeds have different rela-
tive dangerousness ratios with some
degree of accuracy, breed discrimi-
nation should be opposed by the






The law is full of examples where
“actuarially fair” factors have never-
theless been prohibited in under-
writing because of overriding public
interests. Statistical correlation
between behavior and risk, there-
fore, is only the first step in a much
bigger, public policy analysis. Drive-
through deliveries,406 preexisting
medical conditions,407 civil rights,408
and witness intimidation409 are all
examples of where otherwise actuar-
ially justified practices were prohib-
ited by state legislatures and courts
due to overriding interests in equal-
ity, health, and fairness. 
Part IV demonstrated the impor-
tance of dogs and other pets in
society. Pets provide physical and
emotional benefits to humans and
are not mere property. Even if
breed discrimination were actuari-
ally justified, I think a plausible
argument would exist that the
practice should be regulated be-
cause of the public interest in pro-
tecting animal-human bonds.
There is an additional, and
arguably more important, social
value that is compromised by
breed discrimination: homeowner-
ship. Most home buyers require
homeowners’ insurance in order to
purchase a home. This require-
ment comes from mortgagors, who
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require some protection in the
event their security (the home
itself) is destroyed, damaged, or
otherwise made unavailable for
collection.410 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated in NAACP v. American
Family Mutual Insurance Co.,411
“No insurance, no loan; no loan, no
house; lack of insurance thus
makes housing unavailable.”412
The issue in American Family was
a practice known as “red-lining”
where homeowners’ insurance
companies were charging higher
rates, or declining to write insur-
ance altogether, based on geo-
graphic location of insureds.413
The boundaries (“redlines”) that
defined the no-insurance zones fre-
quently fell along racial and socioe-
conomic lines, and the NAACP
brought suit alleging that this
practice was discriminatory and
illegal. The Seventh Circuit held
that red-lining violated the Fair
Housing Act, a statute passed by
Congress to prohibit discrimina-
tion in the housing market.414
It is quite possible that red-lin-
ing was actuarially justified; that is,
it may have in fact cost insurance
companies more to write policies
in certain areas than others. This,
however, did not end the inquiry
for Congress or the Court of
Appeals. The Seventh Circuit held
that homeowners’ insurance is a
service that has the power to make
homeownership available.415 If a
plaintiff can demonstrate that an
application for homeowners’ insur-
ance was rejected or unfairly rated
on the basis of race or another pro-
hibited factor, the practice consti-
tutes discrimination in housing.416
Homeownership is a worthwhile
public interest. People who own
their homes develop roots in a
given community. A homeowner is
less likely to leave than is someone
who is in a year-to-year or month-
to-month lease. The homeowner,
therefore, has a personal invest-
ment in the well-being of the com-
munity. Homeownership provides
an incentive for civic involvement
and community-wide improvement.
For many families, homeownership
is the way to accumulate wealth for
the future.417 Home equity can be
borrowed against for emergencies,
higher education, or retirement.418
The family home is often the most
significant component in an estate
after a parent dies.419
Breed discrimination should,
thus, be viewed in a larger social
context. There is a high social cost
when someone is denied homeown-
ers’ insurance: he is unable to buy
a home.420 The social harm in pre-
venting the dream of homeowner-
ship must be weighed against the
small risk of a dog-bite claim.
There are over fifty million dogs in
the United States, yet only a few
dogs have been responsible for bit-
ing people. 
This is not a simple matter of de-
ciding to throw away the family
trampoline or forgo the purchase
of an in-ground pool. Pets are not
mere property. To make people
choose between the family pet and
homeownership is unfair, unneces-
sary, and goes against an impor-




Let me assume for the moment
that insurers could demonstrate
with some degree of actuarial con-
fidence that some breeds are more
likely to bite than others. Could
there be other ways of controlling
this risk, short of outright denial
of coverage?
Exclusions
When I was shopping for homeown-
ers’ insurance, one of the first
questions I asked insurers was
whether they would write a policy
with an exclusion for dog bites. I
did this because I was desperate—
I needed insurance and I was will-
ing to assume the risk that my
dogs were not dangerous and were
not likely to bite someone. Insur-
ers still turned me away. They re-
fused to write a policy with a dog-
bite exclusion in it.
There are several good reasons
why exclusions may not be good
public policy or wise business
sense. Exclusions operate to the
detriment of third parties, those
would-be plaintiffs who are injured
and need compensation for their
loss. Exclusions would create
pockets of plaintiffs who would, in
effect, have no way to satisfy a
judgment if they could prove liabil-
ity. This is not an insignificant
public policy, for the same reason
that states require certain profes-
sionals to have liability insur-
ance421 and drivers to carry mini-
mum limits on their automobile
policies,422 to provide a source of
recovery for third parties in the
event of a legitimate claim. If we
exclude dog bites or even those
dog bites from breeds we can
prove are the most dangerous, we
would run the risk of creating a
special class of plaintiffs who
would have no source of recovery.
Plaintiffs would have to turn to
other sources in order to have
their basic medical needs met.423
Exclusions are also bad for busi-
ness because they make insurance
less attractive to consumers. A per-
son with cancer is a much higher
risk than a healthy individual. If a
health insurer began excluding
coverage for cancer treatment, few
employers or individual consumers
would purchase that company’s
insurance. My decision to try to
bargain my way into the insurance
risk pool by excluding dog bites
from coverage was, in reality,
pretty stupid. In the rare event
that I was found liable for one of
my dogs biting someone, I would
be solely responsible for the judg-
ment against me. I would lose
whatever equity I had in my house,
my car, my savings, and I could
have my wages garnished. In retro-
spect, an exclusion would not have
been a good choice for me.
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Insure but Reclassify
Another option would be for insur-
ers to write policies for families
with “dangerous” breeds but
charge them higher premiums.
Risk classification is an accepted
practice in the insurance indus-
try.424 By separating and grouping
people of similar risks, insurers
keep rates low for the desirable,
low-risk insureds, and insure ade-
quate resources in the event that
high-risk insureds cause a claim.425
I would have the same objection to
high-risk classification for owners
of certain breeds as I would for out-
right refusals to insure, that is, the
lack of actuarial justification for
the practice of breed discrimina-
tion. Classifying certain dog own-
ers in a higher category is unfair
because it places those insureds in
an artificially higher rate bracket.
This is economically inefficient,
although perhaps more profitable
for the insurer.
Where I think risk classification
could work is if insurers could
demonstrate—to the veterinary
and CDC communities with a suffi-
cient degree of scientific cer-
tainty—that certain breeds, when
they do bite, cause more damage.
It is hypothesized, for example,
that the jaw structure of pit bulls
causes them to inflict more injury
than other breeds.426 This would
still be breed discrimination427
but, in my view, an acceptable form
of risk classification...provided
there is a scientific/veterinary
basis for the conclusion. To date,
the studies in this area have fo-
cused on determining the number
of bites per breed, not the amount
of damage per bite. 
I believe insurers would also be
actuarially justified in classifying
homeowners based on whether or
not they own a dog, period. One
does not need to be an actuary to
state that a dog owner is more
likely than a non-owner to have a
bite claim against him. Insurers
could simply classify all dog owners
at a higher rate level because they
are more likely to have claims
against them. Let’s be clear: this
is not what is going on right now.
The current practice of breed dis-
crimination is to differentiate
among breeds, even though there
is no statistical evidence to prove
that certain breeds are more dan-
gerous than others. This creates an
artificial risk classification that
charges owners of certain breeds
more than others. 
If all dog owners were classified
at a higher rate than non-dog own-
ers, I think there would be a great
public outcry. Then the social value
of dogs as pets—and as security
alarms on four paws—would come
to the forefront of the debate. 
Allow the Marketplace 
to Correct Itself
If, as I conclude, there are no reli-
able data to support breed discrim-
ination, then there is a market of
consumers (owners of rottweilers,
pit bulls, etc.) being overcharged
or not served altogether. This cre-
ates an economic inefficiency. An
insurer with good business judg-
ment would seek to corner this
underserved market by writing
policies with low-risk premiums.
There are a number of reasons
why the market is not correcting
itself. The number and identity of
people being affected by breed dis-
crimination is unknown. Without
these data it would be difficult for
an insurer to market itself to those
consumers. Also at work is the fact
that insurers try to market them-
selves to the lowest-risk con-
sumers. Although these consumers
pay lower premiums, they are re-
sponsible for fewer claims. Every
insurer tries to maximize its num-
ber of low-risk insureds while max-
imizing the number of high-risk
insureds who are serviced by its
competitors.428 The insurance in-
dustry as a whole appears to be
caught up in this breed discrimina-
tion hysteria. Individual companies
may fear that the assumptions
behind breed discrimination are in
fact true and therefore see little
incentive to market themselves to
people they view as high-risk. For
these reasons, it is unlikely that
the marketplace will correct itself
to end breed discrimination.
Other Solutions
Preventing law-abiding homeown-
ers from obtaining insurance is not
the answer to the problem of dog
bites. Better and more effective
alternatives exist.429
Collect Better Data
An initial first step would be to
improve surveillance and reporting
of dog bites. Until accurate num-
bers for the numerator and denom-
inator in the relative dangerous-
ness ratio can be ascertained,
insurers and governments will be
without realistic data on which to
base meaningful decisions. The
need for more accurate data col-
lection has been championed by
the very scientists who have tried
to calculate the scope of the dog-
biting problem.430 In addition,
studies should be commissioned to
determine if certain breeds, when




and Dogs at Large
There are existing laws that, if
enforced more vigorously, could
reduce the number of dog bites.
Dogfighting explains why some
dogs are vicious. This underground
industry brings some dogs “to the
verge of bloodlust.”432 By shutting
down criminal organizations of ille-
gitimate breeders, promoters, and
owners, local governments could
take a first step toward reducing
bites by dogs that have been pur-
posely bred to be dangerous.433 The
AKC and other groups support the
use of existing laws to break up
dogfighting rings.434
Many attacks appear to be caused
by strays or dogs who have been per-
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mitted to run off-leash.435 The
enforcement of existing laws against
“dogs at-large” could reduce the
number of bites.436 While these laws
exist in many places, they are not
adequately enforced.
Owners are sometimes to blame
for socializing a dog to be danger-
ous or for permitting it to get into
situations where it can cause
injury. Dogfighting, leash, and at-
large laws address the root of the
problem, which is irresponsible dog
ownership. A dog is just as good as
his owner trains him to be. One
problem dog can be seized and
destroyed. One problem owner,
however, can continually breed,
adopt, or purchase dog after dog.
Replacing one dog with another, or
one breed with another, will not
help to reduce the overall problem
of owner irresponsibility.437 Exist-





Some dogs, as a result of socializa-
tion (or lack thereof), bad tem-
perament, or genetics, demon-
strate that they are dangerous.
They have a history of bites or
attacks against people or other
animals.438 By regulating these
individual dogs, municipalities can
focus their efforts on the specific
dogs likely to cause injuries in the
future.439 Instead of targeting an
entire breed, governments can
address the handful of dogs who
are really the problem.
There are existing laws that per-
mit local governments to regulate,
or in some cases seize and destroy,
dogs who have demonstrated a
propensity to bite without just
cause. Michigan enacted a statute
to permit local governments to
seize “dangerous animals” and
have them tattooed, insured,
fenced, sterilized, destroyed, “or
any other action appropriate to
protect the public.”440 The statute
provides due process protections
to the owner—requiring a hearing
by a judge and a finding of danger-
ousness before a disposition is
ordered.441 A dangerous animal is
one who, without just cause,442
bites or attacks a person, or a dog
who bites or attacks and causes
serious injury or death to another
dog while the other dog is on the
property or under the control of
its owner.443 Oklahoma has a simi-
lar statute that allows for height-
ened regulat ion o f  an imals
dec lared  dangerous  by  the ir
conduct,444 but prohibits local
governments from enacting breed-
specific legislation.445
“Most of the approximately 55
million dogs in the United States
never bite or kill humans.”446 Dan-
gerous-dog laws are narrowly tai-
lored to address the real problem,
which is the small percentage of
the overall dog population that is
responsible for bites, injuries, and
deaths.447 Dangerous-dog laws
exist in many states. Insurers could
work with local governments to
fund additional animal-control offi-
cers or work with owners of dan-
gerous dogs to help take steps to




Insurers and local governments
could partner together to educate
the public about proper ways of
socializing and approaching dogs.
Proper training is essential for a
family with a new dog.449 Public
education about the importance
of neutering can reduce the inci-
dence of dog bites450 because a
disproportionate number of bites
are caused by intact dogs.451 New
owners should also be educated
about the steps in picking the
right dog for a household.452
“[T]here is no all-around best
breed.”453 Certain breeds will be
more compatible with certain
types of families.454
Children must also be educated
about dealing with dogs safely.455 At
least one study has demonstrated
the effectiveness of public education
as a way to improve children’s behav-
ior around and toward dogs.456 The
study, conducted in Australia, exam-
ined the reactions of children, ages
seven to eight, to a dog that was tied
up in their playground.457 Half of the
study group received a thirty-minute
classroom lesson seven to ten days
before on how to safely approach
and treat dogs.458 Researchers ob-
served the reactions of the children
to the dog.459 The group that re-
ceived the classroom instruction dis-
played greater precautionary behav-
ior than did the control group.
While 79 percent of the control
group hastily patted the dog and
tried to excite it, only 9 percent of
the group that received instruction
did so.460
Conclusion
While dog bites are serious events
for those who are bitten, the dog-
bite problem is not the public
health crisis that the insurance
industry has made it out to be.
Some perspective is in order. The
number of fatalities due to dog
bites is very low when compared to
the number of people who die from
heart disease, cancer, accidents,
suicide, and diabetes. Likewise,
nonfatal bites are responsible for a
small number of injuries when com-
pared to other accidental, uninten-
tional injuries. Falls (11.5 million),
motor vehicle accidents (4.3 mil-
lion), drugs (3.3 million), sports
(2.0 million), insect bites (1.7 mil-
lion), bicycle accidents (1.4 mil-
lion), poisoning (.7 million), and
knives (.6 million) all individually
outrank dog bites (.5 million) as
public health problems.461 Simi-
larly, claims paid out by homeown-
ers’ insurance companies for dog
bites are miniscule when compared
to payouts for property damage.
Damage due to fire, water, wind,
and theft represents much larger
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problems for homeowners’ insur-
ance companies.
One way to eliminate the entire
problem of dog bites would be to
outlaw all dogs.462 Without dogs,
there would be no dog bites and 
no dog-bite-related insurance
claims.463 While this would result in
an elimination of the perceived
financial burden to insurers, it
would not be “practical, realistic, or
desirable” to the average layman,
scientist, or dog owner.464 Unless we
as a society are willing to disregard
the social and health benefits of
dogs as pets, then we must be will-
ing to accept a certain number of
bites. While “[t]he dog bite problem
as a whole is not preventable, it is
controllable.”465 Better alternatives
to breed discrimination exist, such
as education and enforcement of
existing dangerous dog laws.
With over 34 percent of house-
holds owning at least one dog as a
pet, dogs have become valued four-
legged members of our society. To
the families that love them, pets
are not mere chattel. Refusing to
write homeowners’ insurance poli-
cies, therefore, should be a nar-
rowly curtailed remedy, limited to
those families that own dogs who
have proven to be dangerous to life
or property. The insurance industry
has chosen to paint with a very
broad brush. Breed discrimination
is an overreaction, an attempt to
solve a small problem by prejudg-
ing all dogs of certain breeds as
likely to be dangerous in the future.
When insurers develop under-
writing standards and decide which
risks to insure, they have a respon-
sibility to the public interest. In-
surers do not contract with con-
sumers in a vacuum. A long history
of state regulation of the industry
serves as a backdrop for this issue.
Underwriting decisions should be
the product of reason, not specula-
tion. In other words, if insurers are
going to engage in breed discrimi-
nation, they better have hard sci-
ence to back up their practice.
The science behind dog bites is
inconclusive at best. Most of the
scientists authoring studies on dog
bites have acknowledged that their
data are incomplete and should not
be used to enact breed-specific leg-
islation or to deny insurance to
families with certain dogs. No study
has accurately or completely deter-
mined the number of bites per
breed, or the number of dogs per
breed. Without these numbers, it is
impossible to compare breeds on
the basis of dangerousness. Insur-
ers who are making judgments
about certain breeds are doing so
without adequate scientific evi-
dence. This is the Achilles’ heel of
breed discrimination; by acting
without adequate evidence, the in-
surance industry has left itself open
to regulation by the states.
State regulation is necessary to
correct this injustice in the mar-
ketplace. Insureds are being shut
out of entire markets because of
the near-hysteria that has gripped
the insurance industry. This is not
a new phenomenon for the indus-
try. In the past insurers have cut
benefits and denied applications
for insurance based on fiscal cost-
benefit analyses that have had col-
lateral social and health conse-
quences. It was more costly to
keep new mothers in the hospital
for forty-eight hours. Our society
came to the recognition, however,
that discharging new mothers and
their newborns within six hours of
delivery was against public policy.
Legislatures stepped in to correct
the injustice in the marketplace,
knowing full well that it would cost
the industry more money. The
same should be done here.
To the insurance industry, breed
discrimination reflects a belief that
denying coverage to families with
certain breeds of dogs will save
them money. Insurers have not
produced scientific proof that dogs
of certain breeds bite more often
or cause more damage. The evi-
dence simply does not exist be-
cause of the problems of data col-
lection that I have highlighted
here. The irony is that insurers who
are practicing breed discrimina-
tion are turning away good cus-
tomers who pay premiums. Leg-
islative action to correct this
practice will benefit both families
with dogs and the shareholders of
insurance companies. 
Legislative action in this area is
both appropriate and necessary.
What happened to me is happening
across the country to thousands of
other families. To some insurers,
dogs are mere property—like an
old can of paint that can be left
behind when a family moves. The
truth is that dogs are members of
the American family and deserve to
be treated as such. When families
are forced to make the choice
between owning a home and having
a dog, some have no choice at all;
they must give up their beloved pet
to an animal shelter. There are doc-
umented increases in “shelter
drop-offs” due to breed discrimina-
tion. These animals cannot be
housed indefinitely, so many have
to be euthanized. 
The social cost to families is too
much to ride on incomplete statis-
tics and hunches by insurance
executives. Legislative action is
necessary. Luckily, many state leg-
islators have become aware of this
problem and have taken steps to
end breed discrimination. Pennsyl-
vania enacted a statute prohibiting
breed discrimination, which states
the following:
No liability policy or surety
bond issued pursuant to this
act or any other act may pro-
hibit coverage from any spe-
cific breed of dog.466
New York is considering legisla-
tion that would outlaw breed dis-
crimination as well. Bill 6761
would prohibit insurers from refus-
ing to issue or renew, canceling, or
charging or imposing an increased
premium or rate for owning a dog
of a specific breed.467 A New Hamp-
shire bill would prohibit nonre-
newal or cancellation of a policy
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“based solely on the insured own-
ing a certain breed of dog.”468
Other states should follow suit and
enact legislation or administrative
regulations to prohibit the prac-
tice of breed discrimination.
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